DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
9 
d explored the 
* coasts of the 
have founded 
n the western 
Libyan coast, 
century. The 
aments on the 
d in 785); the 
m Euboea and 
tury (Syracuse 
with the south 
establishment 
ilesians had a 
sammetichus I 
that country, 
i the whole of 
to be collected 
ns and beliefs 
and, in parti- 
advantage of 
i two ancient 
ucs, with the 
science was 
as the result 
lich again was 
arts naturally 
necessities of 
lities. It was 
it the sciences, 
i or amenities 
pened first in 
This is why 
for there the 
itotle does not 
i, Babylonian 
first steps on 
re know from 
history, never accomplished except where the existence of an 
organized caste of priests and scholars secured the necessary 
industry, with the equally indispensable continuity of tradi 
tion, But in those very places the first steps were generally 
the last also, because the scientific doctrines so attained tend, 
through their identification with religious prescriptions, to 
become only too easily, like the latter, mere lifeless dogmas. 
It was a fortunate chance for the unhindered spiritual de 
velopment of the Greek people that, while their predecessors 
in civilization had an organized priesthood, the Greeks never 
had. To begin with, they could exercise with perfect freedom 
their power of unerring eclecticism in the assimilation of every 
kind of lore, ‘ It remains their everlasting glory that they 
discovered and made use of the serious scientific elements in 
the confused and complex mass of exact observations and 
superstitious ideas which constitutes the priestly wisdom of 
the East, and threw all the fantastic rubbish on one side.’ 1 
For the same reason, while using the earlier work of 
Egyptians and Babylonians as a basis, the Greek genius 
could take an independent upward course free from every 
kind of restraint and venture on a flight which was destined 
to carry it to the highest achievements. 
The Greeks then, with their ‘ unclouded clearness of mind ’ 
and their freedom of thought, untrammelled by any ‘ Bible ’ or 
its equivalent, were alone capable of creating the sciences as 
they did create them, i.e. as living things based on sound first 
principles and capable of indefinite development. It was a 
great boast, but a true one, which the author of the Epinomis 
made when he said, ‘ Let us take it as an axiom that, whatever 
the Greeks take from the barbarians, they bring it to fuller 
perfection ’. 2 He has been speaking of the extent to which 
the Greeks had been able to explain the relative motions and 
speeds of the sun, moon and planets, while admitting that 
there was still much progress to be made before absolute 
certainty could be achieved. He adds a characteristic sen 
tence, which is very relevant to the above remarks about the 
Greek’s free outlook: 
‘ Let no Greek ever be afraid that we ought not at any time 
to study things divine because we are mortal. We ought to 
1 Cumont, Neue Jáhrhücher, xxiv, 1911, p. 4. 2 Epinomis, 987 n.