This, it should be observed, is a “ native ” instinct, and
is surely conceived as being of use to animals, even when
they are not in the service of man. But however this
may be, the criticism of Mr. Romanes raises the question
as to the universal opinion before the publication of
The Origin of Species on two points. First, did all
philosophers believe that instincts were of no primary
use to the animals that possessed them ? Secondly, did
all philosophers believe that man was the final cause of
creation, and that all things were made for his especial
benefit ?
As to the first point, it is hardly conceivable that any
one who has studied the phenomena of instincts, however
cursorily or under whatever mistaken ideas, could doubt
for one moment that they must, in the first place, have
been of primary importance to their own possessors. But
if evidence is required to show that long ago this opinion
was held, we have only to refer to the pages of Kirby’s
Bridgewater Treatise, in which he speaks of “ the infinite
variety of instincts, and their nice and striking adaptation
to the circumstances, wants and station of the several
animals that are endowed with them.”* Dr. Roget, in
his Bridgewater Treatise, bears testimony to the fact that
the individual and the species are preserved not by “ the
slow and uncertain calculations of prudence,” but by
“ innate faculties, prompting by an unerring impulse to
the performance of the actions required for those ends.”f
“ The doctrine of Instincts,” says Archdeacon Paley, “ is
that of appetencies, superadded to the constitution of an
animal for the effectuating of a purpose beneficial to its
race.”J
* Vol. ii., p. 164.
f Vol. ii., p. pi4.
X Natural Theology, chapter xviii.