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no purpose in that bark ? It is a significant thing to 
begin with that only dogs which have been domesticated 
can bark at all. “ The habit is almost universal with 
domesticated dogs, but does not characterise a single 
natural species of the family.”* But if this is so, does 
not this look as if it were the language which it adopts 
in its intercourse with man? Mr. Romanes admits that 
the barking may be significant in certain cases. 
“ It is not, I think, improbable that what appears to be the ac 
quired instinct of barking is, as it were, an offshoot from this acquired 
instinct of property, and of protecting self as property by drawing 
the attention of a master to the approach of strangers or enemies.”— 
(Romanes. Mental Evolution in Animals, ft. 233.) 
Are not the various tones of that bark suggestive of 
many shades of meaning ? And is not the act of running 
round a carriage and barking an expression of exuberant 
joy and delight, of humble sympathy and affection ? Can 
it therefore be altogether meaningless ? Even in those 
cases in which the dog barks round the carriage which 
does not belong to its master, and it may be supposed to 
be inspired by a love of mischief or a feeling of hostility, 
we can scarcely call it a senseless act from its point of 
view, whatever it may be from ours. 
We are told that “ one animal conceives a strong 
though senseless attachment to another animal of a 
different species.”f This is one of the illustrations given 
of non-intelligent habits of a non-adaptive character ; and 
yet it is difficult to understand how it can be regarded 
either as an act void of intelligence or wanting in adapta 
tion. The relation between man and domesticated animals 
is one which has its obvious uses, whether we have 
regard to the sentimental tie of friendship or the mutual 
* Darwin. The Variation, vol. i., pp. 26-7. 
t Romanes, ft. 183.