58 REPORT OF COMMISSION VII
have been developed at the Photographic Laboratory of the U. S. Air Force
Air Materiel Command (now the Air Research and Development Command).
According to the published data together with the very beautiful and extremely
detailed continous strip-stereo photos in color of enemy positions in Korea, the
finished color transparencies can be studied by the photo-interpreters in stereo
within three hours of the termination of the reconnaissance assignment.
Yet another type of color film which has been considerably improved during
the last few years is the ‘Camouflage Detection” film, developed by Eastman
Kodak Co., which is also sensitized to infrared radiation. Because this so-called
"CD" emulsion not only detects camouflage, but also gives other valuable in-
formation about the terrain, this film type has very successfully complemented
the black and white film as a means of reconnaissance in military intelligence,
STRATEGIC APPLICATION
Photo reconnaissance is one of the most important aids of strategic intelli-
gence. It is always a topical subject, both in peace and in war time; and in
Sweden we have not forgotten that, with the aid of such activities, Hitler pre-
pared an offensive against our country. Industries, power-stations and railway
junctions, etc. and landmarks of importance for finding one’s way from the
air, such as roads, railways and watercourses, had been photographed both from
the air and the ground and carefully described in very comprehensive, secret
handbooks. Many of the photos were taken by German aircraft, but a lot by
Swedish photographers, most likely chiefly for advertising purposes, and were
then purchased in the open market, in many cases as picture postcards. It was
undeniably very valuable intelligence material, which, in this all too easy way,
fell into the hands of the Germans. Especially appreciated were the low obliques,
which, as annotated photos were of great help in obtaining bearings for in-
flying on the target, and, in close-ups, a good basis for precision attacks. Such
pictures seem also to have been popular among leaders of industries and other
concerns who loved to illustrate their advertising folders with perfect pictures
for an offensive. Only naive ignorance of the terrible risks to which our industries
and the lives of the workmen were thus exposed can explain such action. We
must also remember, that seemingly innocent aerial photographs, when inter-
preted by specialists and compared with other pictures of a similar kind, give
exhaustive information regarding the most suitable ways of attack on construc-
tions of capital importance to the country. Thus, since September 1939, the
taking of photographs from the air has been prohibited in Sweden, except by
permission of the Chief of the General Staff of Defence.
Strategic aerial photo reconnaissance in war time is meant to contribute to
correct estimation of the enemy's resources, grouping of forces and intentions.
It is to be a basis for one's own military operations, raids at sea and strategic
air-raids. Through such reconnaissance, information is gathered about strategic
targets of different kinds, such as war industries, communications, power-
stations and dams, naval bases, airfields and fortifications, launching bases for
self propelled bombs, radar constructions, etc. In this way information is also
acquired about the physical nature of the areas in question and the registering
of topographical changes which have been made there. Through this a correct
revision of existing map material, and quick presentation of special maps is
made possible.
As an example of strategic photo reconnaissance, we have the very com-
prehensive photographing activities which usually precede an invasion. From
the aggressor's point of view, the chief task for this reconnaissance is to gather
pictorial material on the coastal areas in question, traffic-routes, harbors and
