es; the Geo-
gical maps
soils of the
ional agen-
g and reset-
Even state,
up the new
oduced air-
ility of the
neras. New
based upon
night flash
correspond-
previous to
itary photo
try. At the
rization of
other Ger-
*) The new
enter about
mbers were
rning from
ent abroad
1 American
, the Unit-
togramme-
fter, addi-
ties and at
g program
onal photo
y Air For-
superior in
owledge.
e increased
new read-
nd Kiel in
n England
np Lejeune
were fre-
these three
1 a partic-
y 1934, pre-
1 equipment
as an aerial
(699)
ular theater. As a consequence of this intensive training progam, thousands of
individuals were exposed to the elements of photo reading and photo interpre-
tation. Although the quality and quantity of training varied considerably from
school to school, the production of such a vast number of reserve military per-
sonnel as photo readers and interpreters provided a considerable impetus to civil
photo interpretation in the post-war years.
The cognizant German, British and American commands turned out quan-
tities of hastily prepared photo reading training materials and photo interpre-
tation reference manuals. Each of these countries also published a periodical
primarily for photo interpreters and designed to bring to their attention a steady
flow of new or interesting airphotos of the enemy’s installations and cultural
landscapes in order to maintain and improve reading and interpretation effi-
ciency as well as to improve morals. ©) As far as is known, the contents of these
military photo interpretation periodicals have never been declassified, though
this may be more from lack of personnel and time to review the material than
from the point of view of security.
The United States forces, in particular, published many volumes of photo
interpretation keys concerned with a wide variety of subjects from landforms
and vegetation to industrial and urban analysis. The British Forces turned out
relatively few of these manuals, partly because of the paper, personnel and time
shortages and partly because their interpretation was largely centralized, where-
as that of the U.S. was widely dispersed.
As the war continued, the German military photo interpretation capability
decreased while that of the British and Americans increased rapidly. The causes
of the German downfall in military photo interpretation are many and varied,
but most of them have to do with the adverse effects of policy decisions on high
levels; the effects of commanding officers in photo reconnaissance and photo
interpretation who were either not technically qualified or not sufficiently
aggressive; the rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe which promoted the best qual-
ified photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation officers out of their tech-
nical billets: and strangely enough, the German penchant for thoroughness
which seldom allowed the production of a method or instrument until it had
been made perfect, a fact which resulted in the Germans’ employing much the
same photo interpretation equipment at the end of the war as they had in the
beginning. There were many other contributory causes, including the jealousy
of the intelligence officers who finally succeeded in having the photo inter-
preters made entirely subservient to them.
In contrast to their military failures in photo interpretation, Smith and
Black (1946) describe the notable advances in the German civil geographic or-
ganizations engaged in photo interpretation. The principal ones were: 7)
1. Wissenschaftliche Luftbildstelle, a special unit of the Deutsche Geo-
9) These were: Germany: Mitteilungen für den Luftbilddienst
Technische Mitteilungen.
England: Evidence in camera.
United States: Im pac t.
7) The following civil agencies also made significant use of photo interpretation: Mil-Geo
(Army), Mar-Geo (Navy), Luft-Geo (Air Force), Eisdienst (Deutsche Seewarte), Wehrgeologie,
Organization Todt, Reichsforschungsrat, Photogrammetrische Abteilung (Reichsamt für Lan-
desaufnahme), Reichsforstat.
