Se A — 
    
t 
à 
4 
j 
i 
i 
  
  
CR ls SS 
  
vu 
ERTS 
TN DEEE " 
wontee eue Anc EU RETE 
iis TT TETE. 
——————T 
  
(728) 
research and others engaged in production, between American and European 
(n fact, even between North and South America) and above all, between 
civilian and military groups. 
It is the civilian versus military disagreements — or rather lack of any 
internal agreements on each side — that I will examine briefly. 
All of us working in the military field know very well that almost 
everything we develop in airborne reconnaissance equipment and techniques 
will be applicable to the problems of keeping the peace. This has been noted 
many times and many places, but its fuller discussion — and implementation — 
scems to be deferred by current events and pressures to some future happier 
time. What is true about the very extensive reconnaissance technology is even 
more obvious and relevant when we consider photogrammetry, mapping, and 
charting. These subjects and activities, the professional concern of all of us here, 
have been of extensive and growing application to a great number of the peace- 
ful activities of organized society. These applications are so well known to all 
of us that no elaboration of this remark is needed. 
It is from the fact of this dual application — to both military and civilian 
activities — that our problems arise. There is no extensive civilian application 
of high speed jet fighters or bombers, of atomic bombs, of tanks, artillery and 
the like. They are considered and evaluated in their appropriate military con- 
text. I am not implying that this consideration and evaluation is therefore easy, 
all I am saying is that it is not confused by outside considerations of non-mili- 
tary application. 
I must digress here for a moment to consider the differences between the 
conclusion — reaching mechanisms of the academic scientist and the military 
scientist. The former will not — and need not — reach a conclusion with 
respect to a bit of research or investigation till he has reached a certain confi- 
dence level in his results. Time is not the determining factor. The military scien- 
tist, on the other hand, almost always is faced with a time deadline and he 
strives to reach the best conclusion by this time limit. He knows if he fails to 
reach the soundest possible conclusion some one else — in general less compe- 
tent — will make the decision, and upon much less information. Lest this system 
of thinking seems completely unsound, I hasten to add that if one is honest, 
keeps a score on his or others judgments, after awhile it becomes fairly clear 
that some people can reach sound conclusions by this system (whatever it is) 
and that still others can't make it work at all. Whatever point I've made here 
— and I feel it really deserves far more detailed discussion and elaboration — is 
applicable to everything that follows, for timeliness, above all else, is of prime 
importance in military activities. 
The problem which I claim is causing so much confusion is simply this: the 
same groups which are responsible for either procuring or producing maps and 
charts for military purposes during peacetime are also responsible for the same 
job during wartime. Now it is well-known and fairly obvious that many maps 
and charts useful to the military organizations can be (and should be) produced 
when there is plenty of time to do it — before a war. But there is also much 
mapping and charting work which must be done under combat conditions. As 
an example, look at the securing of the raw aerial photograph. This radically 
different problem has heretofore been inextricably tied up with peacetime and/ 
or civilian operational methods, to the detriment of the ultimate consumer. 
  
Mm "r3 
pue 
Oo pep He 
n