10 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EDUCATION. 
ultimate origin of sensation or affection. But when we have recognized 
conation as an elemental conscious process, qualitatively irreducible, exist- 
ing alongside of the other two ultimates, we can proceed to ask questions 
as to its successive concrete manifestations—its post-natal development, 
so to say. And here three topics present themselves for discussion : 
(1) The relation of conation to its fellow-elements ; (2) the passage from 
internal to external conative activity ; and (3) the genesis of complex 
ction from simple. 
(1) The first issue has already been discussed under III. above. (2) The 
passage from internal to external conative activity is explained in accord- 
ance with Wundt’s general conception of apperception. Logically, at 
ieast, the internal is the prior of the two. The external is, when psycho- 
logically formulated, nothing more than the apperception of an idea of 
movement. ’ 
We may distinguish apperception itself (the internal activity of will) 
aot only as passive and active, but as impulsive and reproductive. In the 
case of the latter form, it is the memory-image of a particular movement 
which is apperceived ; in the former, the will-process accompanies the 
novement itself. The hypothetical apperception-center, it must be 
remembered, is connected both with the sensory and motor areas; it 
modifies incoming, it can set in motion out-going excitations. There is, 
sherefore, nothing forced in the notion of an impulsive form of appercep- 
iion.* We find now (a) that in the scale of conscious life univocally deter- 
mined volitions appear to precede those which are conditioned by a play 
of motives; (b) that the sensation comes before its reproduction, the fact 
of movement before its memory-image ; and (c) that reproductive apper- 
ception implies the play of motives just now alluded to, and therefore 
inhibits impulse. Putting all this together, we conclude : (1) That the 
‘nternal act of will, apperception, is the primitive act ; there is no con- 
sciousness without apperception ;+ and (2) that the external voluntary act 
springs from impulsive apperception (simultaneous apperception of a 
sense-impression and the movement which this impression physiologically 
conditions), developing by way of taking into itself, at a later stage, the 
idea (memory-image) of movement. From which statements follow two 
important corollaries : (@) Reflex acts are originally impulsive acts, which 
have become mechanical; and (4) the movement-ideas, which are so essen- 
dal to the heterogenists, are on Wundt’s theory secondary phenomena ; 
‘he primitive, impulsive movements were performed without their aid. 
(3) The third problem was that of the genesis of complex action from 
— 
* We must not be led, in this connection, to ascribe to Wundt the positing of an Innervationsempfind- 
ung. (Cf. the collation of passages bearing on this point in Mind, Jan., 1893, p. 143.) His phraseology 
8, unfortunately, loose in places : ¢f. Phys. Psych., ii., 3d ed., p. 235. But revision comes with new 
rditions : Phys. Psych., i., 3d ed., p. 233, is improved in i., 4th ed., p. 228; Hrthik, 1st ed., p. 380, in 24 ed., 
3. 442, etc. 
+ Phys. Psych.. il.. 8d ed.. pn. 470.