DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
9
d explored the
* coasts of the
have founded
n the western
Libyan coast,
century. The
aments on the
d in 785); the
m Euboea and
tury (Syracuse
with the south
establishment
ilesians had a
sammetichus I
that country,
i the whole of
to be collected
ns and beliefs
and, in parti-
advantage of
i two ancient
ucs, with the
science was
as the result
lich again was
arts naturally
necessities of
lities. It was
it the sciences,
i or amenities
pened first in
This is why
for there the
itotle does not
i, Babylonian
first steps on
re know from
history, never accomplished except where the existence of an
organized caste of priests and scholars secured the necessary
industry, with the equally indispensable continuity of tradi
tion, But in those very places the first steps were generally
the last also, because the scientific doctrines so attained tend,
through their identification with religious prescriptions, to
become only too easily, like the latter, mere lifeless dogmas.
It was a fortunate chance for the unhindered spiritual de
velopment of the Greek people that, while their predecessors
in civilization had an organized priesthood, the Greeks never
had. To begin with, they could exercise with perfect freedom
their power of unerring eclecticism in the assimilation of every
kind of lore, ‘ It remains their everlasting glory that they
discovered and made use of the serious scientific elements in
the confused and complex mass of exact observations and
superstitious ideas which constitutes the priestly wisdom of
the East, and threw all the fantastic rubbish on one side.’ 1
For the same reason, while using the earlier work of
Egyptians and Babylonians as a basis, the Greek genius
could take an independent upward course free from every
kind of restraint and venture on a flight which was destined
to carry it to the highest achievements.
The Greeks then, with their ‘ unclouded clearness of mind ’
and their freedom of thought, untrammelled by any ‘ Bible ’ or
its equivalent, were alone capable of creating the sciences as
they did create them, i.e. as living things based on sound first
principles and capable of indefinite development. It was a
great boast, but a true one, which the author of the Epinomis
made when he said, ‘ Let us take it as an axiom that, whatever
the Greeks take from the barbarians, they bring it to fuller
perfection ’. 2 He has been speaking of the extent to which
the Greeks had been able to explain the relative motions and
speeds of the sun, moon and planets, while admitting that
there was still much progress to be made before absolute
certainty could be achieved. He adds a characteristic sen
tence, which is very relevant to the above remarks about the
Greek’s free outlook:
‘ Let no Greek ever be afraid that we ought not at any time
to study things divine because we are mortal. We ought to
1 Cumont, Neue Jáhrhücher, xxiv, 1911, p. 4. 2 Epinomis, 987 n.