I2I 
I venture to say that the reason why no naturalist 
has responded to this challenge arises from the fact 
that he is invited to discover what cannot possibly exist 
in the actual world of nature. No one, however opposed 
he may be to the theory of Natural Selection, would 
think of denying that there is a struggle for existence, 
or that self-preservation is the first law of nature, though 
it is not, let us hope, the only one. In such a case 
the last thing that anyone could expect to find on 
a priori grounds is the existence of organs and instincts 
which are primarily of no use to their possessors, but 
which are employed for the benefit of another species. 
This phenomenon would handicap the assisting species so 
that it would run the risk of self-effacement. 
The fact of the absence of the phenomenon under con 
sideration is said to be “just precisely what we should expect 
if this theory (of Natural Selection) were true, while upon 
no other theory can its universality and invariability 
be rendered intelligible.” But surely all theories of the 
transmutation of species, when brought out of the region 
of pure speculation, must assume as the axioms of their 
reasoning the struggle for existence and the need for 
modification in order that organisms should be adapted 
to new and different conditions. Whatever be the problem 
that a race has to solve—to preserve a present adapta 
tion or to create a new one, to adapt itself to new 
conditions by one method or by another—it must be 
solved in such a way as to secure the preservation of 
the race. 
It is contended that on the hypothesis of the beneficent 
design theory, “ it is inexplicable that no species should 
ever be found to present a structure or an instinct having 
primary reference to the welfare of another species, when, 
ex hypothesis such an endless amount of thought has been