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will in vain torment themselves to define instinct until 
they have spent some time in the head of an animal 
without being that animal.” If a human being argues in 
that way he might almost as well say that he cannot know 
whether the apparently intelligent actions of another man 
arise from intelligence, unless he could spend some time in 
the head of that man, without being that man. But how 
ever good an opinion an individual may have of himself, 
and however broadly he may assume that for the most 
part all other human beings are a pack of fools, he would 
hardly go the length of asserting that, so far as he knows, 
he is the only intelligent being upon earth. 
“ Can we divest ourselves of the persuasion that the movements 
of animals, directed, like our own, to obvious ends, proceed from 
voluntary acts and imply the operation of an intellect not wholly 
dissimilar in its spiritual essence from our own ? ... No artificial 
logic or scholastic jargon will long prevail over the natural sentiment 
which must ever guide our judgment that animals possess powers 
of feeling, and of spontaneous action, and faculties appertaining to 
those of intellect.” 
M. Menault says :— 
“ What!—creatures that have faculties, that feel, remember and 
compare their feelings, that express themselves in a more or less 
direct fashion, but ever in sympathy with their emotions of joy, 
grief, anger, passion—such creatures have no intelligence? By God ! 
I should like to know what intelligence is ! ”—(Buchner. Mind in 
Animals, ft. 20.) 
In execrable verse the poet Prior enunciated a sound 
philosophy, at any rate so far as the following lines are 
concerned :— 
“ Then vainly the philosopher avers 
That reason guides our deeds and instinct theirs. 
How can we justly different causes frame, 
When the effects entirely are the same ? ” 
—(Knowledge. Book /., lines 231-4.)