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In the third place, we venture to affirm that it is most 
improbable that animals would in all cases be conscious 
of the acts which they perform, but not conscious of the 
utility of those actions. It cannot, however, be denied 
that instinct is blind in some connections. The instinct 
of aversion, which leads a young animal to avoid a par 
ticular action, is very strong and constant; and this will 
be necessarily blind, because it does not allow the animal 
to have any personal experience on the subject. A good 
illustration of an inherited aversion will be found in the 
case of the Himalayan rabbit, which Mr. Romanes made 
the object of a most interesting experiment, and from 
whose conduct he drew the probable inference that its 
ancestry had learned long ago to avoid the nettles that 
were indigenous in the country in which they lived ; and 
that this aversion had been inherited. It may also be 
admitted that the first action inspired by a perfect in 
stinct is performed blindly—first, because the response 
of the organism takes place at once, so as to leave no 
time for reflection ; and, secondly, because it would be 
very difficult to prove that the animal knows beforehand 
the purpose of the instinctive action. 
But when we attempt to extend this principle to all 
instinctive action, we are at once beset with difficulty. 
For if the action is successfully performed, it is reason 
able to suppose that the animal which is conscious of the 
action which it performs will also appreciate the utility 
of that action. A young chicken may be supposed to 
scratch by a blind instinct, and in equal ignorance of the 
result to peck at a certain object which it sees ; but when 
it discovers that this object is good and pleasant to eat, 
it is difficult to suppose that the blindness which accom 
panied the first instinctive action is not taken away at 
once and for ever afterwards. On the other hand, when