244 
and at last is inherited as an instinct. But he is not 
content with making this perfectly consistent addition to 
Mr. Lewes’ explanation. He proceeds to say that the 
time comes when intelligence has altogether lapsed ; the 
instinctive action then becomes liable to fortuitous varia 
tions, and Natural Selection secures the survival of those 
that are favourable. 
The first point to remark in this theory as modified 
by Mr. Romanes is that the intelligence of the animal 
is represented as interposing in one case and not in 
another. And this view seems to have arisen from the 
use of the word “ lapsing.” For what can lapsing mean 
except that that which is lapsing will ultimately become 
“ lapsed ” ?—just as the “ going, going ” of the auctioneer 
leads to the “ gone! ” which accompanies the fall of the 
hammer. But if we grant that there comes a time when 
intelligence has lapsed, that cannot mean that it has 
ceased to be present in the experience of the intelligent 
animal, but only that a certain action has become auto 
matic, and that the intelligent element has passed away 
from it. If the intelligent animal still remains intelligent, 
why, it may be asked, should not its intelligence come 
into action in one crisis as well as in another? If a 
change of instinct is necessary in changed conditions for 
the welfare of the animal (and only on that condition can 
Natural Selection intervene), what is to prevent the intel 
ligence of the animal from discerning the necessity and 
striving to meet it. We cannot doubt that it would try 
its very best to discover some new modus operandi as a 
necessary condition of a new modus vivendi. And in 
stances could be quoted to show that the issue was 
between some new mode of action or death. In either 
case the evolution of instinct by Natural Selection would 
be out of the question