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and at last is inherited as an instinct. But he is not
content with making this perfectly consistent addition to
Mr. Lewes’ explanation. He proceeds to say that the
time comes when intelligence has altogether lapsed ; the
instinctive action then becomes liable to fortuitous varia
tions, and Natural Selection secures the survival of those
that are favourable.
The first point to remark in this theory as modified
by Mr. Romanes is that the intelligence of the animal
is represented as interposing in one case and not in
another. And this view seems to have arisen from the
use of the word “ lapsing.” For what can lapsing mean
except that that which is lapsing will ultimately become
“ lapsed ” ?—just as the “ going, going ” of the auctioneer
leads to the “ gone! ” which accompanies the fall of the
hammer. But if we grant that there comes a time when
intelligence has lapsed, that cannot mean that it has
ceased to be present in the experience of the intelligent
animal, but only that a certain action has become auto
matic, and that the intelligent element has passed away
from it. If the intelligent animal still remains intelligent,
why, it may be asked, should not its intelligence come
into action in one crisis as well as in another? If a
change of instinct is necessary in changed conditions for
the welfare of the animal (and only on that condition can
Natural Selection intervene), what is to prevent the intel
ligence of the animal from discerning the necessity and
striving to meet it. We cannot doubt that it would try
its very best to discover some new modus operandi as a
necessary condition of a new modus vivendi. And in
stances could be quoted to show that the issue was
between some new mode of action or death. In either
case the evolution of instinct by Natural Selection would
be out of the question