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PHOTO INTELLIGENCE FOR GROUND FORCES 5 
addition to interpreters. These include divisional and regimental commanders 
and air observers and a great many more. And there are frequent situations 
when, unexpectedly, the advice of a photo interpreter familiar with tactical 
concepts is needed on the spot. 
There are too many arguments against permitting tactical photo interpreters 
to function in any place other than lower echelon headquarters. If an inter- 
preter is primarily concerned with an area facing a division, for instance, he is 
most effective at division headquarters, not at corps or in some central photo 
installation. How else can he possibly understand what is expected of him, how 
he is to provide it, and how fast? The tactical interpreter should be as close as 
possible to the end users of his information. 
The interpreter in a tactical situation dares not work in a vacuum. Look at 
the task. The interpreter does not actually see guns or trenches or wire under 
his stereoscope. He sees a miniature three dimensional illusion which becomes 
operationally meaningful only in the light of his training, his experience, his 
immediate environment and perhaps some chance remark he heard yesterday 
in the intelligence section. To make useful sense out of what he sees, the in- 
terpreter has to study the thinking of his enemies, he has to learn the charac- 
teristics and employment of their weapons and he has to know their collective 
habits. To do this effectively, and to keep his information current, he must be 
close to the enemy. 
For instance, it may be a well known fact at the regimental level that the 
enemy is at the moment showing a particular preference for billeting in houses 
rather than bivouacing in the woods. If this fact is ever reported to higher head- 
quarters at all, it will be contained as a sidelight in a lengthy intelligence sum- 
mary which may or may not be seen by the photo interpreter. But this minor 
item is common knowledge at battalion or regiment or division and the in- 
terpreter can successfully target a group of buildings which arouse his sus- 
picions, and which serve not only as a barracks but also as a command post. 
The tactical interpreter works best when he functions as an intelligence 
officer whose particular collection method happens to be photo interpretation. 
He needs to keep abreast of order of battle, prisoner-of-war reports, documents 
reports, analyses of weapons, capabilities and intentions. These tell him where 
to look, why to look, and how to explain what he sees. He does not have to 
waste time, his scarcest commodity, on a millimeter by millimeter search of 
each print in a sortie. 
Tactically, the interpreter must maintain his access to ground information 
and he must identify himself with other basic intelligence activities. Otherwise 
he can furnish only mechanical photo reading, not photo interpretation. The 
interpreter has to grasp the general intelligence picture and apply it to his own 
particular problem. The prerequisite is tactical erudition. 
This explains a characteristic of ground force tactical interpreters; they are 
conversant with a great many intelligence matters which superficially would - 
seem to be none of their concern. 
Because of his physical location, because of the particular pressures under 
which he works, and because he often sees the results of his interpretation with 
his own eyes, the tactical interpreter feels that he has little in common with 
other interpreters farther to the rear. This may be, in part, the common attitude 
of combat men toward support troops but, even if it is, it enhances the tactical 
interpreter's worth. 
Tactical interpretation cannot be performed successfully out of range of 
shells and bombs. The tactical interpreter must have the viewpoint of the