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research and others engaged in production, between American and European
(n fact, even between North and South America) and above all, between
civilian and military groups.
It is the civilian versus military disagreements — or rather lack of any
internal agreements on each side — that I will examine briefly.
All of us working in the military field know very well that almost
everything we develop in airborne reconnaissance equipment and techniques
will be applicable to the problems of keeping the peace. This has been noted
many times and many places, but its fuller discussion — and implementation —
scems to be deferred by current events and pressures to some future happier
time. What is true about the very extensive reconnaissance technology is even
more obvious and relevant when we consider photogrammetry, mapping, and
charting. These subjects and activities, the professional concern of all of us here,
have been of extensive and growing application to a great number of the peace-
ful activities of organized society. These applications are so well known to all
of us that no elaboration of this remark is needed.
It is from the fact of this dual application — to both military and civilian
activities — that our problems arise. There is no extensive civilian application
of high speed jet fighters or bombers, of atomic bombs, of tanks, artillery and
the like. They are considered and evaluated in their appropriate military con-
text. I am not implying that this consideration and evaluation is therefore easy,
all I am saying is that it is not confused by outside considerations of non-mili-
tary application.
I must digress here for a moment to consider the differences between the
conclusion — reaching mechanisms of the academic scientist and the military
scientist. The former will not — and need not — reach a conclusion with
respect to a bit of research or investigation till he has reached a certain confi-
dence level in his results. Time is not the determining factor. The military scien-
tist, on the other hand, almost always is faced with a time deadline and he
strives to reach the best conclusion by this time limit. He knows if he fails to
reach the soundest possible conclusion some one else — in general less compe-
tent — will make the decision, and upon much less information. Lest this system
of thinking seems completely unsound, I hasten to add that if one is honest,
keeps a score on his or others judgments, after awhile it becomes fairly clear
that some people can reach sound conclusions by this system (whatever it is)
and that still others can't make it work at all. Whatever point I've made here
— and I feel it really deserves far more detailed discussion and elaboration — is
applicable to everything that follows, for timeliness, above all else, is of prime
importance in military activities.
The problem which I claim is causing so much confusion is simply this: the
same groups which are responsible for either procuring or producing maps and
charts for military purposes during peacetime are also responsible for the same
job during wartime. Now it is well-known and fairly obvious that many maps
and charts useful to the military organizations can be (and should be) produced
when there is plenty of time to do it — before a war. But there is also much
mapping and charting work which must be done under combat conditions. As
an example, look at the securing of the raw aerial photograph. This radically
different problem has heretofore been inextricably tied up with peacetime and/
or civilian operational methods, to the detriment of the ultimate consumer.
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