3.3.3 Implementation Phase The consolidation of program and 
capability are only the beginning of the technology transfer 
process. Unless these elements are embodied in a proactive and 
self-sustainingapplications environment little operational technology 
transfer can be anticipated. 
Demonstration It is essential that the promise of technology, 
infrastructure and capability translate into physical demonstrations 
relevant to perceived needs. These demonstrations must also be 
sensitive to the issues of technology availability and acceptability 
addressed below, as well as to the cultural aspects of the specific 
applications environment. This local sensitivity is a strong feature 
of successful programs. (He et al, 1991) 
Application While the Geomatics literature boasts literally 
thousands of demonstrations, it has been observed (Failloux, 1989) 
that very few of these have been translated into operational 
applications. Weakness or absence of linkages between technology 
development, applications and problem-related needs and a parallel 
imbalance in technology vs applications funding have been 
common and seemingly unavoidable characteristics of remote 
sensing programs in developed and developing nations alike. 
Integration For many years remote sensing applications were 
simply explorations of but one technology applied to natural 
resource problems. Recently, with heightened awareness and new 
technology capabilities, the need to integrate remote sensing with 
other technologies as well as with existing mapping and 
management systems has been addressed more frequently. 
Domestic R&D The development of an independent R&D capacity 
is essential to sustain the processes at work during the 
implementation phase of technology transfer. This capacity may not 
and perhaps should not be fully independent of outside influences 
or contacts. However, sufficient indigenous capacity must exist to 
ensure that trends in research are responsive to domestic needs, 
priorities and conditions. This has been a particularly important 
thrust of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) 
program in remote sensing. (Valantin, 1991). 
4. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Technology Doesn't Transfer Itself 
Early in the development and demonstration of most technologies, 
the obvious potential benefits of its application seem evident and 
compelling to all - except those who might employ the technology 
as a tool. In remote sensing the level of resistance to innovation 
from traditional resource management disciplines was severely 
underestimated during the 1970s and much of the first half of the 
1980s. Applications which may have seemed self-evident to the 
technologists and repeated demonstrations which have appeared 
definitive have often failed to overcome resistance to change. 
Experience has demonstrated that beyond careful program 
development, structuring and management; successful technology 
transfer will require deliberate efforts to earn the confidence of 
potential adopters. Simply showcasing the specifications and 
potential performance of the new tools has proven consistently 
insufficient. (Plourde, et al, 1983; Dobbins et al, 1983; Ryerson et 
al, 1983; Ryerson and Arnason, 1981). 
These efforts must approach the question of resistance to change 
from the adopters' perspective. 
The technology transfer strategy must address the following 
questions: 
-How do we RECOGNIZE resistance to innovation or change? 
-What is the relationship between RESISTANCE and RISK? 
-What are the SOURCES OF RISK? 
-How can we MODEL technology risk? 
-How can we MANAGE technology risk? 
These questions are dealt with in the second component of the 
technology transfer model described here. 
242 
4.1 Resistance to Chan 
Resistance to change must be recognized for what it is - one of the 
natural human and organizational reactions to the "threat" or the 
"promise" of change. Resistance is not necessarily an indicator of 
fundamental flaws in technology. It is clear, however, that the sources 
of such resistance must be identified and understood if technology in 
capable hands is to attract greater confidence and acceptance. 
Resistance to technology can be characterized as a measure of the 
variance between science and technologies assessment of and 
response to societal needs; and human perceptions of the validity and 
value of that response (UNESCO, 1981). 
Inertia and Momentum Bodies at rest tend to stay at rest - Inertia. 
Bodies in motion tend to remain in motion - Momentum. Both of these 
concepts of physics provide useful analogies for the human and 
organizational reaction to change. At both levels, change can threaten 
relationships and methods of operation which appear from the inside 
to be stable and successful. The old adage "If it isn't broken, don't fix 
it" is often the principle of choice. This is so, even though that this 
choice may breed complacency and false confidence, particularly in 
a rapidly evolving and increasingly demanding environment of change. 
We are now moving from an era when product failure was of more 
concern than obsolescence, to one in which obsolescence is much 
more likely to precede product failure. This has understandably 
presented individuals and organizations with fundamental challenges 
to traditional decision making with regard to technological change and 
innovation. 
Inertia and momentum remain the most persistent sources of 
resistance to new technology. There is little that the technology 
transfer program can do in isolation from a broader awareness of this 
problem at the national level. Nonetheless, identification and 
quantification of inertia and momentum as sources of resistance to 
change can provide specific, valuable information relevant to all 
aspects of program planning from technology development to 
technology transfer. 
Authority Acquiring or developing the authority to implement or 
encourage technology change in organizations is influenced by factors 
such as policy, mandate and management support. These are outlined 
above as elements of a technology transfer program. Without clear 
evidence of empowerment, authority over remote sensing will either be 
in dispute or will be exercised with severely constrained vigour. 
Elitism From its inception in the 1960s remote sensing has suffered to 
varying degrees from charges of elitism. It must be acknowledged as 
well that elitism has been promoted from within as well as being a 
product of biased perception from outside the technology. Perhaps the 
most visible and most widely recognized result of elitism in the 
technological establishment has come to be termed “technology push”. 
Faced with frustration over what is seen as resistance to innovation, 
the technology establishment has often resorted to promotion of 
technology as a benefit in its own right quite apart from application. 
The reasoning being that in the presence of high technology, 
applications will be encouraged to evolve more quickly than they 
would in a more technology-limited environment. While there is some 
empirical justification for this view, the simple presence of ever more 
sophisticated technology has not generally been rewarded with 
equivalent growth in applications or technology transfer. Indeed, in 
some cases, it has fostered an anti-technology reaction from the user. 
Assessing and Managing Risk Research in such varied areas as 
theories of innovation and negotiation (Neirenberg, 1968) have long 
recognized that real CHANGE takes place only as a response to 
recognition of NEED. The assessment of need is influenced at least as 
much in terms of RISK as it is in terms of benefit. If risk can be 
equated with resistance to change or innovation, then assessment of 
risk must be a fundamental strategy of any technology transfer 
program or effort. 
A strategy to manage risk must consider the following basic elements: 
-Identifying the sources of risk 
-Understanding the risks from the adopter's perspective 
-Taking action to control and reduce risk, both real and perceived.