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REALITY— WHAT PLACE IT SHOULD HOLD IN PHILOSOPHY. 683 
clusion we must have the object or truth in the conclusion involved in the 
premise or premises. 
The attempt to prove Reality has ever led to unmeasurable confusion 
and error. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, propounded an 
argument, Cogito ergo sum. But if the ego be in the cogito the whole 
alleged argument for Reality is an evident assumption, for already we 
have the Reality there. If the ego be not in the cogito we have no proof 
whatever, as what we have in the conclusion is not in the premise. 
WAY IN WHICH REALITY IS DISCOVERED. 
Starting in this way with real objects, we prosecute farther investigation 
by induction. This is the method pursued by Reid and the Scottish 
school. It was derived originally from Francis Bacon, and had already 
reached many important points in the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton and 
others. The Scottish school perceived this, and were anxious to secure 
ike results in the study of the human mind, using self-consciousness 
rather than the senses in the gathering of the facts. In this way they had 
oeen 80 far successful in the account which Reid and Stewart and others 
nad given of the faculties of the mind. Not that they for one instant 
regarded this induction as the foundation of their philosophy, which had 
ts foundation within itself in the principles of common sense (Reid) and 
fundamental laws of thought (Stewart). But they represented Induction 
as the means of discovering these laws. Thus they built up a philosophy 
esting on deeper principles, bet discovered by the cautious and safe 
method of Induction. 
We may consider more carefully the way in which Reality is discov- 
ered. Take this stone or this tree. I perceive them to be realities by the 
senses, especially of sight and the sense of touch, and I cannot be made 
so decide otherwise. I cannot prove it mediately or by syllogism ; I have 
no premises to establish the point that this stone exists or this tree exists. 
The mind has cognitive powers by which it discerns these objects, that 
they exist. In the same way, by the inner sense or reflection, we discover 
within us at once certain things, such as hope and fear, joy and grief, 
axciting us. 
By the same or farther cognitive powers we may come to know farther 
jualities of these objects—of this stone, that it is hard ; of this tree, that 
it grows rapidly. This knowledge may increase from day to day till the 
number of objects becomes beyond our calculation. When there is an 
addition or multiplication of these real objects there is no lessening or 
Increasing of Reality, which continues the same. 
Having Reality in the individual object—say in the stone or tree—we 
have Reality in the general notion, in stone or tree. Having Reality in the 
qualities of concrete objects, we have Reality in the abstract. Thus, Reality 
in the hardness of the stone implies Reality in its quality of hardness.