(08 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EDUCATION.
neither does “active ” signify ‘‘ unconditioned,” nor do we intend by the
distinction to mark off two separate qualities of will. The apperceptive
act is passive when it is univocally determined—a loud sound ¢ forces”
our attention, as we say. It is active when it is multivocally determined
—when different ‘“ motives” are at work, striving to determine it in differ-
ant directions. The division is one of degree, not of kind ; the criterion
axternal, not internal.
The chief conditions of apperception may be briefly tabulated as
follows :
(¢) External.—(1) Relative adaptation of the (in the particular case)
appropriate motor apparatus; (2) character of sense-impressions (inten-
sity, quality, duration, extension); (3) absence of complicating impres-
sions.
(6) Internal. —(1) The affective value of impressions; (2) the relation
of impressions to the (individually different) psychophysical ¢“ stock” or
““ capital ”—to a man’s ‘“ psychostatical conditions,” as Lewes calls them
‘memory, education, mood, habits, etc.) ; (3) absence of complicating
mental processes.
IIL.—THE SPHERE OF CONATIVE ACTIVITY *
Wundt’s doctrine of will was classed above with those of Beneke and
Fortlage, as being more broadly conceived than the views of the other
oositivists. The critics have, of course, not been slow to remark on this
width and extent of apperceptive activity in his psychology. Professor
Muensterberg speaks somewhere of the great Sammeltopf of apperception ;
and Dr. Ziehen, in his preface, indulges in similar sarcasm. But if once
‘he actuality of the activity-experience is granted, its far-reaching charac-
ter must be also allowed. Without going into full detail, I will attempt
;0 shown in outline the rdle which Wundt ascribes toit. (1) As regards the
other conscious elements. A sensation can be apperceived. And not ounly
s affection a frequent determinant of will, but the sense-feeling is itself
she mode of reaction of apperception upon sense-impression. (2) As re-
gards fusions of the conscious elements. The idea (fusion of sensations)
can be apperceived. Attention, desire, instinct, obviously all involve the
presence of conation. Emotion implies, at least, passive, and the ‘“intel-
iectual feelings” (eesthetical, religious, ethical, logical) active appercep-
tion. (3) As regards combinations of conscious elements. The idea (com-
dination of sensations) can be apperceived. Associations of ideas must
excite the passive apperception, and may also be actively apperceived, and
shus transformed to ¢“apperceptive combinations.” Impulsive movements
and voluntary movements alike demand for their analysis the recognition
of the conative element. (4) As regards the self-consciousness. This arises
* Phys. Psych, 1., 4th ed, p. 587 f5.; ii., 8d ed., 289 ff. 361 ff, 408 fE., 487 fl. Phil. Stud., Lc. Vor
lesungen, p. 288 ff. System, p. 562 ff. Kiielpe, I. ¢., p. 432 ff. + P. iii.
