WUNDT'S PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WILL. 709 
from a sum of (a) permanently present ideas, (0) standing in a relation of 
dependency to the will. In the last instance, the activity-experience or 
apperception-experience usurps the full dominion, and of itself constitutes 
she ego—the ideational content becoming of secondary importance. 
This scheme is, as I have said, but a bare outline. It must be filled in 
from the writings of Wundt himself. But we can see clearly from it the 
vast importance predicated of the will. As Dr. Kiilpe puts it : * “In the 
adult consciousness there is but one content which is either not dependent 
on conation, or not fused or combined with it—the perceived sensations 
and ideas. In all our remaining mentality, apperception is somehow 
implicated.” 
[V.—THE PHYSIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATE OF APPERCEPTION.$ 
Like all other mental processes, the activity-experience must have a 
ohysiological (neural) correlate. There are two points to notice: (1) We 
ind, as a matter of pathological fact, that lesion or degeneration of the 
frontal lobes brings with it disturbances of the “intelligence,” of the 
moral nature, and of the “will.” (2) There is a relativity of neural func- 
sion, as there is a relativity of mental process. Neural function is a mat- 
ter of neural connections and relations. Now apperception requires both 
sensory and motor connections. The special sense-centers must excite 
the organ of apperception centripetally ; excitations from the organ must 
he able to reach the motor centers centrifugally, and issue in voluntary 
movements. These conditions are given in the frontal lobes. ¢¢ Highest- 
level neural synthesis” i may be safely predicated of them. From this 
point of view also, then, the seat of apperception seems indicated with 
-olerable clearness. But the localization of the ‘organ of apperception” 
is confessedly hypothetical and tentative. 
V.—THE GENESIS OF CONATION.§ 
There are, plainly, two opposed views, prevalent in psychology, of the 
genesis of the will: the heterogenetic and the autogenetic view. The 
former derives conation from the non-conative, the latter declares that 
will cannot be deduced from any process but its own. Herbart and Lotze 
are typical adherents of heterogenesis; Wundt maintains the autogenetic 
standpoint ; Bain occupies an intermediate position between the two 
schools. 
The question of the ultimate origin of will, psychology cannot attempt 
to answer. It asks as much or as little about this as it asks about the 
rere ttn tt 
¥ L.c., p. 437. 
+ Phys. Psych., i., 4th ed., p. 228 ff.; ii., 3d ed., p. 240 ff. Kiilpe, I. c., pp. 438 ff. 
t Cf. Waller, Brain, lix. and Ix., p. 393. 
§ Phys. Psych. ii., 8d ed., p. 463 ff. Essays, p. 286 ff. Phil. Stud., l.c. Vorlesungen, p. 288 fI., 461 i 8 
System, p. 579 ff. Kiilpe, I. ¢., pp. 440 fT.