REPORT OF COMMISSION VII 
GVII-53 
tion other than military. Some of these developments are noted in other 
sections of this report. 
3. Strong indication of the effectiveness and reliability of photographic 
interpretation was given by President Eisenhower of the United States 
at the Geneva Conference in 1955, when he proposed the free exchange 
of aerial reconnaissance between the USSR and the United States as a 
means of inspection for possible military build-up in the two countries. 
PRESENT STATUS: 
The following discussion of some of the factors affecting present-day mili 
tary interpretation was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel B. v. Vegesack of the 
Royal Swedish Army, as a part of Sweden's contribution to the Commission 
VII report. As it is believed to represent perhaps the best summary of present 
problems in military interpretation which can be prepared in the light of secu 
rity restrictions, it is reproduced here without change. 
* * * 
“Military Interpretation 
“B. v. Vegesack 
Lieutenant Colonel Royal Swedish Army 
“Military photo interpretation differs from other forms of interpretation in two 
important ways, among others. 
“Military photo reconnasisance is systematically obstructed on the part of those 
who risk being exposed to it. By means of aerial counter-attack, attempts are made to 
hinder or impede the taking of photographs. Camouflage has the purpose of hiding the 
reconnaissance targets, dummy constructions aim to confuse the photo interpreters. 
“Aerial photo reconnaissance and interpretation must be fitted into their military 
place. They must be accommodated to each phase of warfare. The practical value of the 
interpretation is to a great degree dependent on rapid results. The time ingredient is 
often of decisive importance. 
“These reasons, among others, make it inexpedient to deal with the progress of 
military photo interpretation as a subject by itself, unrelated to the general changes of 
modern warfare. Notwithstanding the fact that the process of interpreting the photos 
under the stereoscope has not changed to any great extent in prospect, for example, of an 
atomic war, still, the aims and composition of photo reconnaissance will be influenced by 
the new age. On this account it is necessary to view the aims, means and development of 
military photo intelligence in the light of those preconceptions under which it is practised. 
Here an attempt shall be made to demonstrate some of the new factors which can be 
taken into consideration for bringing changes. 
“Nowadays camouflage technique continually reckons photo reconnaissance as its 
most formidable enemy, and it tries to evolve means to evade discovery by photography. 
The fact that units have been provided with modern camouflage material has made it 
much more difficult to pin-point targets photographically. Consequently the demand for 
clarity of detail has increased. Furthermore, a larger negative scale than earlier is occa 
sionally required, which entails an increase of the number of photographs. Film emul 
sions with ‘de-masking properties’ have come into use more and more as an aid in dis 
covering camouflaged targets. When the identical target is photographed with both 
ordinary black-and-white film and camouflage-detecting film, the number of photos is 
doubled. 
“In order to lessen the risk from AA fire it has been found necessary to increase the 
speed of the photo reconnaissance planes at least to equal that of the fighter planes. Fre 
quently, photos can only be taken alternatively from great altitude, or from height which 
is very low in relation to the speed of the planes. 
“The continually increasing plane speeds and the higher standard of photographic 
clearness and accuracy makes it imperative that motion-compensated cameras be used 
on a larger scale than heretofore. Reconnaissance from low altitude is a special problem.